The collapse of the labor, housing, and stock markets beginning in 2007 created
INTRODUCTION
The enormity of wealth disparities and their growth prior to the Great Recession is well documented (Wolff 1995; 2006; Keister 2000; Klevmarken et al. 2003) . As demonstrated below, in 2003 households at the 90th percentile of the net worth distribution held 73 times the net worth of households at the 25th percentile. Similarly, households in the highest income quintile had median wealth that was 45 times the median of households in the lowest income quintile. And whites had median wealth that was over six times that of nonwhites. These disparities dwarf disparities in individual earnings and household incomes (Keister and Moller 2000; Oliver and Shapiro 1997; Scholz and Levine 2004) .
This study assesses the extent to which the Great Recession altered the distribution of wealth through 2011. We begin by using repeated cross-sectional data from two widely-used surveys, the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), to document changes in wealth inequality.
Motivated by hypotheses that the Great Recession affected some groups more than others, we further examine whether pre-existing disparities in wealth across socioeconomic groups were exacerbated. We then make use of the longitudinal nature of the PSID data and examine wealth changes for individual households over time. We determine whether the ranking of households based on their wealth after the recession was similar to the ranking prior to the recession, i.e., whether -despite the dramatic declines in wealth due to the Great Recession -the households that were at the top (bottom) of the wealth distribution before the crash remained at the top (bottom) through 2011. Lastly, we estimate the magnitude of wealth losses -and gains -for individual households and identify the households characteristics that were associated with wealth losses to learn what types of household were able to weather the recession more and less effectively.
BACKGROUND

Long-terms trends in the distribution of wealth
Previous studies have documented trends in the distribution of wealth for the United States from its founding years (Shammas 1993) and have shown that wealth inequality increased throughout the 18 th and 19 th century, with the most pronounced increases occurring during the industrialization period of the 19 th century. The concentration of wealth at the very top, i.e. the share owned by the wealthiest one percent, rose sharply over this period, peaking immediately before the Great Depression of 1929 and falling rapidly in its aftermath (Ohlsson et al. 1997) . A gradual decrease in wealth inequality ensued up to the late 1970s (Wolff 1995) . Wealth inequality began to increase again in the 1980s: between 1983 and 1989, the share of wealth held by the wealthiest one percent grew from 33.8 percent to 37.4 percent, the net worth of the bottom 40 percent decreased, and the Gini coefficient rose from .799 to .832 (Wolff 2006) . The growth of wealth inequality slowed in the 1990s and remained relatively stable during the 2000s leading up to the Great Recession (Wolff 2010 Kennickell 2009 . In Figure 1 , we index the inflationadjusted value of net worth at 1.0 in 1984 for households at four points in the distribution.
Since this year, the PSID has collected detailed wealth information on a regular basis. Racial inequalities in wealth holdings are substantial. Oliver and Shapiro (1997) estimate, based on data from the 1988 Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), that the median net worth of African American families was a mere 8 percent that
of the median net worth of white families. The racial net worth gap remained around 10 cents on the dollar in the 1990s and 2000s (Wolff 2006; Scholz and Levine 2004) .
Early evidence on the effects of the Great Recession on the distribution of wealth Bricker et al. (2012) , using the 2007 and 2010 waves of the cross-sectional SCF, find that the largest relative declines in net worth were for people below the 75th percentile of the wealth distribution. Median wealth declined for all income groups except the top decile. Mean wealth declined more for minorities than whites, while the change in median wealth was similar for the two groups.
Emmons and Noeth (2012), also using the 2007 and 2010 SCF, demonstrate that the percentage losses in wealth were larger for younger families, families headed by young and middle-aged African-Americans and Hispanics, and families headed by people with less education. Analyzing data from a variety of sources through, for the most part, 2009, Wolff et al. (2011) find that almost all groups experienced substantial wealth losses, but the losses were particularly large for young families, minorities, and middleclass households.
Using SCF longitudinal data from 2007 to 2009, Kennickell (2011 Kennickell ( , 2012 finds that the largest relative declines in net worth were for people below the 30th percentile of the wealth distribution and most pronounced for those in the bottom 10 percent who were particularly likely to fall into net debt. Bucks and Moore (2012) , using the same panel data,"find"that"two"thirds"of"families"had"wealth"losses,"and"the"median"loss"among"
losers"was"around"$60,000."They"also"found"that"wealth"inequality"increased" between"2007"and"2009."
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"Using"the"2007"-"2009"longitudinal"data"from"the"PSID,"Bosworth"(2012)" finds"that"the"median"change"in"wealth"was"negative"for"all"three"income"terciles"
(based"on"2007"income)"and"education"groups,"was"roughly"the"same"across" education"groups"(although"the"decline"was"slightly"higher"for"the"high"school" educated),"and"was"smaller"for"families"in"the"bottom"third"of"the"income" distribution"in"2007"(!8".6"percent)"than"families"in"the"top"third"(!15.1"percent)." Shapiro"et"al."(2013) "show"that"losses"of"net"worth"for"African!Americans"were" greater"than"for"whites"between"2007"and"2009."
Based"on"SIPP"data,"the"Census"Bureau"reports"an"increase"in"median"net" worth"of"30"percent"between"2000"and"2005"followed"by"a"sharp"decline."By"2011,"
median"net"worth"was"16"percent"below"that"of"2000" (Gottschalck et al. 2013 ). Taylor et al. (2011 , also using SIPP data, show that between 2004 and 2009, the white-to-black ratio of median net worth increased from 11 to 19 and the white-to-Hispanic ratio from 7 to 15.
Group differences in wealth losses during the Great Recession
One goal of this study is to document changes in wealth disparities across socioeconomic groups. While, for the most part, we do not seek to explain why these changes have occurred, they are likely to have resulted from and changes housing and stock prices, recession-related changes in employment, and savings behaviors. Less-educated, minority, and low-wage workers typically experience greater increases in unemployment and reductions in work hours and earnings during recessions than more advantaged workers (Hoynes, Miller, and Schiller, 2012) . As a result, they are less likely to maintain !"6""!" . Families that purchased a home shortly before the collapse of the housing market, who are disproportionately younger families, had lower levels of home equity and therefore were most vulnerable to having an "underwater mortgage," defined as having negative home equity (Stafford et al. 2012, Owens and Wimer 2013) . Also, those living in areas where unemployment was extremely high were more likely to have experienced greater declines in home equity, as there was wide variation in the distribution of housing price declines across the country.
DATA
Few nationally representative surveys include detailed assessments of wealth holdings. (Solon 1992) .
Third, the early-release PSID data for 2011 are now available, whereas the SCF data beyond 2010 are not. !"9""!"
RESULTS
Repeated cross-sectional analyses
Absolute changes in wealth. Table 1 reports the net worth distribution as estimated using the PSID in the top panel (for longer-term trends see Table B .1 in Appendix B) and the SCF in the bottom panel. For the PSID, we also report net worth excluding home equity and other real estate to demonstrate the importance of changes in the housing market both before and after the recession.
According to the PSID data, prior to the Great Recession, median wealth In the bottom part of the PSID panel in Table 1 , we show the trend in the measure of net worth that excludes home equity and other real estate. These data highlight the Wealth inequality. The Gini coefficient and various percentile ratios from the PSID and SCF data document substantial increases in the dispersion of wealth both before and after the Great Recession (Table 2 , for longer-term trends see Table B .2 in Appendix B). Our focus is on changes in these disparities leading up to (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) and following (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) the Great Recession. In almost every instance, the more advantaged group has much higher net worth and experienced a larger absolute decline (or increase, depending on the time period) than the disadvantaged group. In sum, despite the significant impact of the Great Recession on the overall dispersion of wealth demonstrated above, the recession did not fundamentally alter the ordering of households along the wealth distribution. Another way to demonstrate this is to compare the PSID recession wealth mobility rates (Table 4a) to mobility rates before the Great Recession (Table 4b) . They are strikingly similar across nearly all cells of these two mobility tables. The main type of mobility for which we can observe some change during the recession is the extent of downward mobility from the middle of the distribution: While close to 30 percent of households at the middle quintile showed downward mobility both before and during the recession, the share of households at the middle quintile that was demoted to the lowest quintile doubled (from 5.1 percent before the recession to 10.8 percent after the recession).
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Disparities in changes in wealth. The longitudinal data allow us to examine changes in wealth for particular households. In Table 5 The second panel shows that 9.1 percent of households fell into debt -that is, they had positive net worth in 2007, but negative net worth in 2011.
The third panel in Table 5 shows relative changes in net worth for households that are shown in Table 6 for absolute losses for all households and in the first row of Table 7 for relative losses for those households with positive net worth in 2007.
It is not surprising that households who had higher net worth prior to the Great Recession experienced greater absolute losses. For example, those in the top net worth quintile were 6.39 times more likely to have experienced any loss and 58.57 times more likely to have lost more than $50,000. These highest net worth households were, however, only one-third as likely to have fallen into debt (last column in Table 6 ) as the lowest net worth quintile.
Holding pre-recession net worth quintiles constant, there are few significant coefficients for the pre-recession income quintiles. The highest income quintile was about 39 percent less likely to have experienced any loss than the lowest income quintile (holding initial wealth quintile constant) and 31 percent less likely to have lost more than $10,000.
Everything else equal, whites and Asians were much less likely to have lost significant wealth than African Americans, Hispanics, Native Americans and others: 30 percent less likely to have lost any wealth, 37.5 percent less likely to have fallen into debt, and 74 percent less likely to have lost at least $250,000. Households with heads who have a BA degree were 36 percent less likely to have lost any wealth compared to those without a high school degree. In general, the older the household head, the more likely -and higher -the absolute losses. However, the likelihood of falling into debt is highest for households with heads under the age of 35. Married couples were more likely to fall into debt than households with unmarried male heads. Households with children were more 2 percent more likely to have lost any wealth.
These conditional associations are illustrated graphically by generating, based on the regression coefficients reported in Table 6 , predicted probabilities of losing more than $10,000 for several hypothetical households. In Figure 3 , we report the predicted probability of losing at least $10,000 for households in the third pre-recession permanent income and third pre-recession permanent wealth quintiles, who have children, and whose head is married, white or Asian, has a college degree, and is between the ages of 35 and 54 years old. For this baseline household, we predict the probability for a loss of at least $10,000 is 57 percent. If instead the household was in the bottom pre-recession income quintile -and the other observed characteristics were the same -this probability would be 61 percent. If the household head was a high school graduate and not a college graduate, the likelihood of loss would be 64 percent. The large differences by race/ethnicity are demonstrated by the fact that the rate would be 66 percent instead of 57 percent if the household head were nonwhite -all else equal.
The first row of Table 7 the BA or more than a BA) compared to high school drop outs experienced wealth losses that were roughly ten percentage points lower. Households with a white or Asian head lost, all else equal, 13.8 percentage points less than those with a non-white head.
Households nearing retirement (55-64) lost four percentage points less than households
headed by someone under 35 years old. And households with children lost three percentage points more than those without.
These conditional associations are illustrated with predicted probabilities in Figure 4 . Again, the racial differences in wealth losses stand out: The same baseline household described above lost 31.9 percent of its wealth while the same household with a non-white head lost 45.7 percent of its wealth.
Evidence on the impact of unemployment. So far, we have documented the extent, the distribution, and the factors associated with wealth losses after the Great Recession.
Because of the extensive effects of the Great Recession on the labor market (Freeman, this issue), we now turn to the potential contribution of unemployment to these wealth losses. If households use their assets to smooth consumption in reaction to income losses, as economic theory suggests, we should observe higher wealth losses for those experiencing unemployment. This is indeed the case, as seen in the second column of Wealth changes following the Great Recession also differed greatly across socioeconomic groups and were patterned similar to changes in income and unemployment documented elsewhere (Hout et al. 2011; Smeeding et al. 2011; Freeman this volume) .
That is, the most disadvantaged groups (non-whites, young adults, the less-educated) experienced the greatest relative wealth losses and were the most likely to have fallen into debt. In addition, we found a particularly strong racial/ethnic bias in losses even when comparing households with otherwise equal socio-economic characteristics.
The American economy has experienced rising income and wealth inequality for several decades and there is little evidence that these trends are likely to reverse in the near term. It is possible that the very slow recovery from the Great Recession will continue to generate increased wealth inequality in the coming years as those hardest hit may still be drawing down assets to cover current consumption.
ii While wealth is reported as of the interview date, the PSID income measure refers to the year prior to the survey (that is, 2002, 2004, and 2006) . iv We have conducted a range of sensitivity tests with different specifications of the prerecession wealth predictor, such as logged net worth and net debt and the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation. These do not alter the substantive conclusions presented here. These sensitivity checks were motivated by the possibility that a relatively crude measure of baseline wealth, such as the quintile dummy indicators used here, may bias the effects of various indicators of disadvantaged status downwards (e.g. the racial gap). There is some indication that our estimates of the racial effects are conservative based on sensitivity checks that include interactions between baseline wealth and race (results available from the authors).
v Regression models that predict net worth gains between 2007 and 2011 generally mirror those presented here and are available from the authors upon request. " Table 4a . Quintile-to-quintile wealth mobility during the Great Recession, PSID Table 6 Note: Baseline predicted probability is for a household in the third pre-recession permanent income and third pre-recession permanent wealth quintiles, with children, and whose household head is married, white or Asian, has a college degree, and is between the ages of 35 and 54 years old, 95 percent CI shown Figure A .1 shows the PSID field periods (in grey) and their convenient timing compared to the macro-economic shocks of the Great Recession. !"17""!" 
TABLES
